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analysis "trustworthiness" is the prime determinate. Experience demon-
strates that a declaration of pain, made while a declarant is suffering, is more
likely to be sincere and accurate. The circumstances are such as to render
the deelarant incapacitated, to some degree, to plan a falsification. Hence
the admissibility of this kind of evidence depends upon whether the pain or
suffering is contemporaneous or co-existing with the declaration. Rogers v.
Grain, tupra; Newman v. Dodson, 61 Tex. 91 (1884). It is submitted, that
in following this rule the principal case is applying a sound limitation on the
admissibility of such evidence in requiring that such declaration be spontane-
ous and a limitation that has been fairly uniformly adhered to by the Texas
courts: Apparently this rule has been incorrectly applied in some instances.
St. Louis Sout mestern y. v. Norvell, 115 S. W. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909,
writ of error refused); International & G. N. Ry. v. Lane, 127 S. W. 1066
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910). A criticism of these cases is probably not justified,
due to the failure of the opinions to adequately disclose the circumstances
which accompanied the declarations.
J. WV. M. Jr.
EvIDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTics-No 'TREsuurroIN" AS To FncixoAL VALUE
OF UNDIVIDED INTEiET.-Kishi sued the Humble Qil Company for damages
for loss in market value of his three-quarters undivided interest in an oil
and gas lease up6n which the Humble had drilled a dry hole, after the ex-
piration of a lease executed by Kishi and his cotenant, the drilling being
with the consent of the cotenant, but over Kishi's protest. The trial court-
and Court of Civil Appeals gave judgment for defendant (261 S. W. 228
(1924) ), but the Commission of Appeals reversed these judgments and rendered
a judgment for $37,500 for Kishi (276 S. W. 190 (1925)), being three-
fourths of the total value of the lease as found by the two lower courts.
Upon second motion for rehearing the Commission of Appeals reversed its
former decision and remanded the case to the district court, with instruc-
tions to ascertain the value of the three-quarters undivided interest, saying
it did not feel justified in presuming that a three-quarters undivided interest
in an oil and gas lease is worth exactly three-fourths of the total value of the
lease. Humble Oil and Refining Go. v. Iisli, (Tex. Comm. App. 1927, not yet
reported).
This is apparently a matter of first impreslion in Texas, and no authorities
are cited to support the decision. If in saying it will not "presume" that
a three-quarters undivided interest is worth three-fourths of the total value
of the lease the. court means it will not make a conclusive presumption to that
effect, the question is really one of judicial notice, and the decision amounts
to saying that the court will not judicially notice the value of undivided in-
terests. It is more probable, from other language in the opinion, that the
court means this is a fact which may be inferred from other facts, or may be
proven, and that it will not as an appellate court make this fact inference,
but will leave it to the trial court to find this fact, either by inference or
from evidence. In either light the holding seems sound. An undivided in-
terest is usually worth less than its fraction of the total value of the lease,
because the purchaser is uncertain as to what action the other cotenant may
take in the development of the lease, and as to when the other cotenant may
exercise its statutory right of partition. Art. 6082, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
(1925).
N o change is made in the original holding on the merits of the case.
See (1926) 4 TEXAS LAW {EvIEw, 215 for an extended criticism of the deci-
sion awarding Kishi damages. The court overrules defendant's contention
that is was rightfully on the land under authority of one cotenant, saying
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that its entry "was unlawful, not because it had no right to make entry, but
because the entry made was in denial of Kishi's right."
V. E.
ADDENDU.-This is not the first time that a turn of a phrase has decided a.
case. A good sounding sentence very frequently obscures the problem under
consideration. The court says defendant's entry "was pnlawful not because it
had no right to make entry but because the entry made was in denial of
Kishi's right." This puts an entirely new face on the problem. Defendant
is thus admittedly in rightful possession of the land and was not a wrong-
doer in conducting drilling operations. But defendalt's wrong consisted in
denying Kishi's "right" (presumably Kishi's right of entry and right to.
drill). Assuming this to be correct, the question then arises: What was it
that caused Kishi's damages? Was it the denial of Kishi's right of entry,
etc., or was it the drilling of the dry hole by defeiidant in pursuance of its
admitted right to prosecute drilling operations? Clearly the market value
of Kishi's interest in the lease was destroyed by the latter. Hence under the
court's hypothesis the problem becomes one of causal relation, and on such
basis it would seem that defendant should have had judgment.
After all is said it would seem that the only problem in the whole case
was whether this sort of risk (a fall in market value of the lease) is one
which a cotenant in possession takes when he denies in good faith the pos-
sessory claim of another cotenant. Is such risk protected against by the rule
at the basis of the common law action of trespass as invoked in the case
at hand? Prior to this decision such had never been the law. If the law is
to be extended thus far it should have been done upon a more articulate basis
than is reflected in the opinions of the court. The processes by which new
boundaries are given to legal rules such as here involved ought to be made
clear and not left to the turning of dubious phrases. Any injustice that
may fall upon the defendant is not the only bad result that ordinarily may be
expected to follow such a decision.
Leon Green.
Yale University.
JURISDICTION-NTEREST As AmOUNT In "CoNTrovEsy.-Plaintiff sued in
the district court to collect the sum of $384.75, balance due an estate by a
guardian according to the finding of the probate court, plus ten per cent
interest (for a period of more than ten years) allowed by art. 4189, TEX.
REv. Crv. STAT. (1925) where guardian neglects to invest surplus money is
his charge. Held, the district court had jurisdiction because the interest al-
lowed by Art. 4189 is "of the nature of damages fixed by law to compensate
for the loss conclusively presumed to ensue from the guardian's breach of
duty." Holman v. Ward, 288 S. W. 148 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
The interest which is to be excluded from the amount in controversy in
determining jurisdiction of courts under art. V, sections 8, 16 and 19, Con-
stitution of Texas, and Arts. 1819, 1821, 1906, 1949, 1950 and 2385, TEX. REV.
Crv. STAT. (1925), is interest eo nomine, i. e., conventional interest, ex-
pressly provided for by the contract of the parties; or, interest allowed by
statute as compensation for the use or detention of money. Ibid., Art. 5069;
McDaniel v. rat. Steam Laundry, 112 Tex. 54, 244 S. W. 135 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1922). Except that expressly provided for by contract, this kind of
interest is purely a creation of statute. Heidenlteimer v. Ellis, 67 Tex. 426,
3 S. W. 366 (1887) ; Esc ue v. Hartley, 202 S. W. 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
But this refers only, it seems, to the. interest allowed on a sum payable and
ascertained under a written contract, interest on an open account, under art.
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